2003 WL 1878783

  ‑‑‑ F.3d ‑‑‑

(Cite as: 2003 WL 1878783 (7th Cir.(Wis.)))

MAJOR OFFENSES

The child will be sent immediately to the principal for disciplinary action, and the parent will be notified. An attempt will be made to notify the parents when corporal punishment is needed; however, a swat will be given regardless [sic] if the parent can be reached or not. All discipline must be given the same day as the offenses were made, and the principal will administer the swat. Parents should deal with each mark at home to deter getting enough marks for a swat.

 Nearly two weeks later, on November 16, 1998, Wichman interviewed M.G. alone to discuss the spankings she received while attending Greendale. M.G. described the spankings to Wichman, indicating that the first time physical punishment was given for inappropriate behavior (e.g., lying), and the second time was due to rule violations that she claimed were not her fault. She stated that the second paddling was administered above the rear area, approximately six inches above her tailbone, and that she had struggled to get away from Bond. M.G. also informed Wichman that she knew of at least one other student, a boy named John (i.e., plaintiff John Doe Jr.), who had been spanked by Bond as well. She did not say, however, that John Jr. had been hurt by the spanking. Based solely on the statements of Mrs. P. and M.G., Wichman concluded that M.G. had been bruised by the second spanking.

 The next day, on November 17, 1998, Wichman met with his supervisor, Christine Hansen, to discuss his contacts with Mrs. P and M.G.; specifically, the injury M.G. had allegedly received as a result of the second spanking administered to her by Bond and M.G.'s assertion that another student at Greendale had been spanked as well. Wichman expressed his concern to Hansen that: (1) "the principal may have been out of control in administering the physical punishment to [M.G.], and may have been out of control at other times with other children, and may be again when administering this type of punishment"; (2) young children "were being subject to this type of physical discipline";  [FN3] (3) "the parent/student handbook specified this type of punishment was used"; and (4) "a number of the parents [might have] prior Child Protective Services referrals." After reviewing the Greendale parent/student handbook and Wichman's written reports of his interviews with Mrs. P. and M.G ., Hansen "decided that the report of abuse as to [M.G.] could be substantiated because there was credible evidence from the student and [her guardian] that the abuse had occurred.... [and] that further investigation into the circumstances of the second child [identified by M.G. as having] been swatted was in order."  [FN4] The decision to substantiate M.G.'s abuse was contrary to Bureau's Investigation Standards, which provide that substantiation can occur only after the assigned caseworker has obtained statements from all "pertinent persons," including the alleged maltreater and any eyewitnesses. At the time Hansen made the decision to substantiate Bond, Wichman had not interviewed Bond or M.G.'s teacher, Carol Finck, who was present during both of the girl's spankings.

FN3. Greendale educates children from kindergarten to fourth grade.

FN4. The decision to expand the investigation to include other students at Greendale came after Hansen and Wichman consulted with Bureau attorney, Barb Reinhold. According to Hansen, "[a] framework was provided to us by our attorney, and we implemented the framework.... [to] identif[y] other children who [M.G.] thought may have been hit like she had been ...."

 *3 On November 25, 1998, Wichman interviewed M.G. again to obtain a physical description of the student she identified during the first interview as having been spanked by Bond. On December 7, 1998, at Hansen's behest, Wichman prepared an internal case summary on the alleged spanking of John Doe Jr. and "the allegations in regards to corporal punishment that has [sic] been uncovered at the Greendale Baptist Academy." After reviewing the case summary, and consulting with Bureau attorney Reinhold, Hansen concluded that it would be appropriate for a caseworker to interview John Doe Jr. at the school. She also determined that John Jr.'s parents should not be notified of the interview, believing that they might be complicit in any abuse that may have occurred, since they presumably knew of the school's corporal punishment policy but did not prevent their child from being spanked.

 In order to facilitate the expanded investigation, Hansen and Reinhold directed Wichman to complete an intake referral form for John Doe Jr., which he did on December 14, 1998. On that form, Wichman noted his opinion "[t]hat any child in the Academy that has been physically disciplined in the manner that this [case]worker's assessment ha[s] revealed, should be also assessed for CPS services." Finally, more than three months after the first complaint, the report was screened in for a 24‑hour investigation, and, on December 15, 1998, the file was assigned to Carla Heck, another Bureau caseworker.

 On December 16, 1998, Wichman and Heck went to Greendale to interview John Doe Jr. [FN5] They did not call the school ahead of time because Bond, the principal, was the alleged maltreater. Prior to their departure, Bureau "supervisors and upper management," which included Bureau attorney Reinhold, advised Wichman and Heck that if John Jr. identified other children who had been spanked, they were required to make referrals on those children in the same manner that John Jr. had been referred. Wichman and Heck also took along a copy of Wis. Stat. ' 48.981(3)(c)1, which provides, inter alia, that "[t]he agency may contact, observe or interview the child at any location without permission from the child's parent, guardian or legal custodian if necessary to determine if the child is in need of protection or services, except that the person making the investigation may enter a child's dwelling only with permission from the child's parent, guardian or legal custodian or after obtaining a court order." Both Wichman and Heck believed, from training and as a matter of Bureau policy, that this statute gave them the authority to interview John Jr. at Greendale without a court order or the consent of his parents or the school. [FN6]

FN5. The district court noted that although "Ms. Heck presumably discussed the case with Mr. Wichman [before visiting Greendale] ... [she] did not document any discussions she may have had," and that "[t]his apparent failure violated [Bureau] 'protocol,' which indicates that all contacts with a reporter (even a co‑worker) should be documented."

FN6. Section 48.981(3)(c)(1) has been interpreted as providing Bureau caseworkers with the authority to interview children at school without the permission of parents or school personnel. See 79 Wis. Op. Atty. Gen. 49 (1990).

 At approximately 2:15 p.m., Wichman and Heck entered the foyer of Greendale Baptist Church (the school is located inside the church building). When Principal Bond came out of his office to greet them, Wichman and Heck advised him that they were with the Bureau and had come to the school to interview a student. After requesting and receiving proper identification, Bond asked them to identify the child they wished to interview. Wichman and Heck then gave Bond a physical description of the child and a first name ("John"), which Bond immediately recognized as John Doe Jr. Bond asked Wichman and Heck to wait in the foyer while he notified the church's assistant pastor, Gary Holloway, of their intent to interview John Jr. Shortly thereafter, Bond returned to the foyer with Holloway. Holloway asked Wichman and Heck whether he was legally required to allow them to interview the boy. Wichman and Heck told Holloway that he was required to allow them to conduct the interview, provided him with a copy of ' 48.981(3)(c)1, and advised him that the statute gave them the authority to interview the child at school without notice or parental consent. Holloway stated that it was his understanding that a court order was required before a private school could be forced to allow such an interview to take place on its premises. Wichman told Holloway that a private school was no different than a public school under the statute, and that they had the authority to conduct the interview at the school. Heck stated that they could call the police, who would then force the school to allow the interview in short order. Holloway then asked what the interview would involve, and whether he or Bond could be present during the questioning. Wichman and Heck stated that their investigation was confidential, that they were not at liberty to disclose the purpose of the interview, and that neither Bond nor Holloway could be present during the interview. At this point, Bond and Holloway told Wichman and Heck that they were not going to allow the caseworkers to interview John Jr. without a court order, and suggested that the police be called to intervene in the matter. Wichman then left the building and called the police from his cellular phone.

 *4 Shortly thereafter, Officer Michael Adamczak arrived on the scene and met with Wichman and Heck in the church's parking lot. Unsure of how to proceed, Adamczak called the police station and requested guidance from his supervisor, Captain Robert Dams, on how to handle the matter. Dams called the local district attorney's office, and received confirmation that ' 48.981(3)(c)1 gave the caseworkers the authority to interview children suspected of abuse on school premises without having to notify or obtain the consent of their parents or the school. Dams and two other police officers then traveled to Greendale to assist Adamczak in advising Bond and Holloway that the caseworkers had the authority to interview John Doe Jr. Although Holloway reluctantly agreed to allow the interview, he remained apprehensive about doing so and questioned Dams about whether the caseworkers needed a court order. Dams advised Holloway that "a court order was not needed for an interview under exigent circumstances,"  [FN7] and presented him with another copy of ' 48.981(3)(c)1. After Dams made it clear that he was going to force the school to allow Wichman and Heck to interview John Jr., Bond and Holloway allowed the caseworkers to proceed with their investigation. John Jr. was then escorted to the nursery section of the church for the interview.

FN7. Although Dams made reference to "exigent circumstances," neither the caseworkers nor the police officers indicated that they believed John Jr. was under any threat of immediate harm.

 During the interview, John Doe Jr., a fourth‑grader, told Heck that Bond had spanked him once with a long wooden paddle approximately four months ago, and that he held back tears during the spanking. He also stated that after the spanking Bond and his teacher, Carol Finck (who had witnessed the spanking), prayed with him. Although she had not yet spoken with Bond or Finck, Heck immediately suspected that abuse had occurred "due to the fact that a fourth‑ grade boy would admit to wanting to cry." Heck also asked John Jr. whether his parents were aware that he had been spanked. The boy indicated that they were aware of the spanking. Heck then asked whether his parents had ever paddled him at home. John Jr. stated that both he and his sister had been spanked before by their parents, and laughed as he told Heck of an incident where the plastic paddle used by his parents to spank them broke during a spanking of his sister. He then told Heck that after the plastic paddle broke, his parents used a plastic or metal spatula to spank them. Heck also asked John Jr. about his father's military history, where his father worked, and where his sister attended school. Finally, Heck asked John Jr. whether he knew of any other students at the school who had been spanked. John Jr. stated that he was aware of at least six other students, whom he identified for Heck.

 After the interview, Wichman and Heck attempted to interview Bond, but Bond declined to answer any of their questions without an attorney present. Wichman then gave Bond his business card, and requested that he call to arrange a time when they could meet. Wichman and Heck made no attempt, however, to interview Carol Finck, the teacher who had witnessed the spankings administered by Bond to both M.G. and John Doe Jr. The caseworkers and police then drove to the Doe residence to interview John Jr.'s parents, but they were not home. Heck left a note for the Does, requesting that they contact her immediately regarding an urgent matter. Later that day, Mrs. Doe returned home, saw the card, and immediately called Heck. Heck was not in at that time, and Mrs. Doe left her a voice message. Within approximately fifteen minutes, Heck called Mrs. Doe back to arrange a meeting. Mrs. Doe told Heck that she was overwhelmed that the Bureau had interviewed her son at school, but nonetheless agreed to meet with her the following day at 3:00 p.m.

 *5 On December 17, 1998, Mrs. Doe telephoned Heck thirty minutes before their scheduled appointment to reschedule the meeting for sometime after the holidays. Heck asked why she was cancelling the appointment so close to the time of the meeting. Mrs. Doe simply repeated that it was necessary for her to reschedule the meeting. Heck then became angry, informed Mrs. Doe that she "could take this whole thing up a notch," and "go to the District Attorney with what I already have." Heck also stated that she did not believe Mrs. Doe was taking the matter seriously and that she and her husband were "hindering [the] investigation." Mrs. Doe told Heck that neither she nor her husband were attempting to hinder the Bureau's investigation, and that they both respected the work performed by social workers. Priorto the conclusion of the conversation, Mrs. Doe advised Heck that she and her husband would be retaining an attorney, and that she would have the attorney contact Heck regarding the Bureau's investigation of their family. Before Mrs. Doe could say goodbye, Heck slammed the phone down, hanging up on her. In her written report, Heck indicated that "she [Mrs. Doe] cancelled the meeting and refused to discuss anything further."

 Later that day, Wichman called Greendale's attorney, Michael Dean, to set up an interview with Bond. Dean proposed that they all meet at his office, but Wichman demanded that the meeting take place at the Bureau. Wichman then told Dean that if the meeting did not take place at his office, he would simply report that Bond had refused to be interviewed. After the conversation, Dean wrote a letter to Wichman memorializing the offer to meet at his office, but Wichman never responded to the letter and made no further attempts to interview Bond. Instead, Wichman misrepresented to Hansen and David Hergert, a deputy director with the Bureau, that Bond had flatly refused to be interviewed.

 On December 18, 1998, Wichman and Heck went to several private schools in the area in an attempt to interview John Doe Jr.'s sister, but they were unable to locate her. Later that afternoon, Heck called Mrs. Doe to schedule an interview, but Mrs. Doe informed her that she and her husband had not yet secured the services of an attorney. Heck went on vacation on the next day, and did not return until December 28, 1998. During her absence, however, Wichman continued to work on the case, and, on December 21, 1998, conferred with Hansen and Bureau attorney Reinhold on how to proceed with investigating the possible maltreatment of the other children identified by John Jr. as having been spanked by Bond. There was some confusion on the appropriate course of action, as the Bureau had little experience dealing with private schools or individuals represented by counsel. There was also some discussion of turning the entire matter over to the police, but they eventually decided to open "companion" files on all of the children. [FN8] They also decided to interview the children identified by John Jr. without notifying or obtaining the consent of their parents, once again assuming that the parents were aware of the school's disciplinary policy, had consented to it, and were not protecting their children from being spanked by Bond.

FN8. In one of Heck's written reports, she indicated "it is unknown whether the parents of children attending this school [Greendale] are aware of the discipline techniques being used," that she was "not aware of any action taken by the school in response to these incidents," and that she felt "any child attending this school who has been subjected to inappropriate physical discipline should be assessed for [Bureau] services."

 *6 On December 23, 1998, Wichman issued "mandatory" reports on the other Greendale students being investigated. Contrary to Bureau protocol, however, Wichman opened a file on the corporation, "Greendale Baptist Academy," rather than on the specific children or parents. He did so without the knowledge or consent of Hansen, who later indicated that she had "no inkling" why Wichman had handled the cases in such a manner. Using a church membership directory that he had taken from Greendale, Wichman also ran background checks (for prior contacts with the Bureau) on every family listed in the directory, whether they had children enrolled at the school or not. Although Hansen did not "exactly agree" with this action because she "felt [it] a little too intrusive," she did not object to Wichman conducting the background checks.

 On December 28, 1998, at approximately 9:00 a.m., the Does received a telephone call but chose not to answer the phone, deciding instead to let the caller leave a voice message. The caller did not leave a message, however, and Mrs. Doe dialed star (*) 69 to ascertain where the call had originated. This process revealed that the call had been placed by someone at the Bureau. A few minutes later, the phone rang again. Once again, the Does allowed the call to go into their voice mail. This time, Heck, having returned from vacation, left a voice message, informing the Does that: (1) she had yet to hear from their attorney; (2) if she did not heard from their attorney within 24 hours, "the Bureau will take steps to ... protect the children in your home ... under Chapter 48";  [FN9] and (3) "This is it! I am not messing around anymore!" (slamming the phone down). This message upset the Does greatly because they interpreted it as a threat to remove their children from their custody. Shortly after hearing Heck's message, the Does contacted their attorney, who immediately called Heck to advise that she had been retained by the Does but needed time to confer with them before an interview could be arranged.  [FN10]

FN9. Another Bureau supervisor, Iris Colon Lucio, testified in a deposition that she considered Heck's demand that the Does provide her with the name of their attorney within 24 hours to be unreasonable, noting that "[i]t's not something that I would say is generally‑‑something we would request ...."

FN10. Throughout the remainder of the Christmas season, the Does allege that they "lived in constant fear that Ms. Heck or one of her associates would come to [their] home and remove [their] children," and that this fear caused them: (1) to maintain "a continual watch for strange vehicles, believing that Ms. Heck or an associate might come in an unmarked car or van"; (2) not to let their children play outside (during this time period) without one of them present to "guard to [e]nsure no [Bureau] case worker came for them"; (3) to put up blankets over their windows to prevent Heck or anyone else with the Bureau from monitoring their activities; and (4) to purchase a caller identification system to screen any calls from Bureau caseworkers.

 That same day, Wichman had a meeting with Sergeant Belli and Officer Adamczak of the Greendale Police Department, during which he informed the officers that the Bureau was still in the process of conducting its investigation of Greendale, and supplied them "with copies of [Bureau] reports ... a copy of the [school's] handbook, the church directory and some information [the Bureau] received off of the Internet in regards to Bob Jones University." Wichman also told the officers that if the Does did not have their attorney contact the Bureau within the next 24 hours, he and Heck planned to go to their residence and physically remove the children from their custody so that they might be interviewed. [FN11] Finally, Wichman advised the officers that "due to the large number of juveniles" that needed to be interviewed, the Bureau would be seeking the police department's assistance in the near future.

FN11. Christine Hansen testified in a deposition that Wichman's stated intention to the police that he would seek to remove the Doe children from their parents' custody, if true, would have been illegal, a drastic step, and inconsistent with Bureau protocol.

 *7 On January 6, 1999, Wichman, Heck, and Christopher Partridge, another Bureau caseworker, went to Greendale for the purpose of interviewing the six children identified by John Doe Jr. as having been spanked by Bond. Notwithstanding the degree of resistence they had previously faced, the caseworkers made no attempt to obtain a court order before attempting to interview these students. When the caseworkers arrived at Greendale, Bond refused to allow them to interview any of the children without a court order. Wichman advised Bond that the Bureau caseworkers had the authority under state law to interview the children on the school's premises, and that, if necessary, he would call the police to force him to comply with their demand. Bond maintained that he would not allow the caseworkers to speak with any of the children regardless of any police involvement. At this point, the caseworkers exited the building, entered the Bureau van, and began calling various individuals for instructions on how to proceed. Heck called Bureau attorney Reinhold to ask for her advice. Partridge informed his supervisor, Mike Kemp, of the stalemate. Kemp directed the caseworkers to call the police for assistance, which Wichman did. After fifty minutes of waiting outside, Wichman called the police again. Two police officers eventually responded to the call, but after conferring they all decided to return to the police station for further deliberations. Upon arriving at the police station, the caseworkers learned that the school's attorney, Michael Dean, had called the police and requested that the caseworkers be barred from Greendale's property as trespassers.

 Unsure of how to proceed, Heck called Reinhold again and one of the police officers called the district attorney's office. It was determined that the caseworkers had the authority to enter the school for the purpose of conducting interviews with the children. The caseworkers then returned to Greendale, this time accompanied by four police officers. Before re‑entering the building, however, the caseworkers received a call from Kemp, who cautioned them not to push the matter too far. Once inside, the caseworkers and police officers were met by Bond and Dean. The police officers told them that the caseworkers had a duty to investigate allegations of child abuse, and that if Bond refused to grant the caseworkers access they had no problem playing "hardball"‑‑i.e., arrest Bond for obstruction of justice. Dean advised the police that his client was taking this position because the children were in the physical custody of Greendale and the school did not have the authority to grant the Bureau permission to speak with the children without parental consent, remarking, "I don't know why they don't just get an order from a judge. If they get the order then we can't do anything about it."

 Notwithstanding the threat of arrest, Bond refused to allow the caseworkers to interview the children without a court order or parental consent. The police officers and caseworkers then made several calls to the district attorney's office and the Bureau to advise their superiors of Bond's refusal to give the caseworkers access to the children. After conferring with Bureau supervisor Hergert, the caseworkers abandoned their efforts to interview the children due to the level of resistence they had encountered. On her way out of the building, Heck told Bond, "This case is not over yet, believe me." Additionally, one of the officers informed Bond and Dean that a shift commander would be coming to the school, and that there was a distinct possibility that the police department "would direct their own investigation, which would include interviewing the children at the Academy." The Does, in response to the foregoing events, took their children to a friend's house later that evening to spend the night, fearing that someone from the Bureau would come to their home and attempt to remove their children from their custody. The next day, Mrs. Doe purchased a cellular phone to enable her to keep in constant contact with her husband regarding the Bureau's ongoing investigation of their family. [FN12]

FN12. According to Mrs. Doe, she took a leave of absence from work from December 17, 1998 through January 19, 1999 because she "was afraid to be away from her children for any length of time ... not knowing what [the Bureau] might do."

 *8 In late February 1999, Bureau supervisor Iris Colon Lucio telephoned the Does' attorney, Sheila Smith, to speak with her about the ongoing investigation. Smith told Lucio that the Does adamantly denied abusing their children. Lucio informed Smith that the Bureau would hold the Does liable if the school applied corporal punishment to their son resulting in physical abuse, and instructed Smith to advise the Does accordingly. On February 28, 1999, shortly after this conversation, Lucio sent Smith a follow‑up letter advising that the investigation of the Does was being closed because "[i]n discussing the matter with you, we have been assured that there is no safety, nor service needs for the ... family." The Bureau's internal documents, however, indicated that the investigation had been closed because of the Does' refusal to cooperate, thus preventing caseworkers from substantiating abuse. A few months later, the Bureau ended its investigation of Greendale altogether; caseworkers never returned to the school and eventually all of the files relating to the investigation were closed.

 On August 12, 1999, Greendale, John and Jane Doe (individually and on behalf of their minor son, John Doe Jr.), and seven other parents (John and Jane Roe 1‑7), filed suit against Heck, Wichman, and Hansen, individually and in their official capacities with the Bureau, [FN13] pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 1983, alleging that the defendants: (1) conducted an unreasonable search of Greendale's premises in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) illegally seized John Jr. in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (3) violated all of the plaintiffs' rights to familial relations under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (4) violated all of the plaintiffs' rights to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs also challenged the constitutionality, both facially and as applied, of Wis. Stat. ' 48.981(3)(c)1, to the extent this statutory provision purportedly provides Bureau caseworkers with the authority to "contact, observe or interview ... [a] child at any location without permission from the child's parent, guardian or legal custodian if necessary to determine if the child is in need of protection or services ...." Id. In this respect, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief from the enforcement of this aspect of Wis. Stat. ' 48.981(3)(c)1, and requested a declaration that the statutory provision was unconstitutional. In response, the defendants argued that none of the actions they took during the Bureau's investigation violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights, and, alternatively, that even if their actions were unconstitutional, the constitutional rights at issue in this case were not clearly established, thereby entitling them to qualified immunity from the plaintiffs' suit. The defendants also maintained that ' 48.981(3)(c) is constitutional, both facially and as applied to the plaintiffs. Thereafter, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The district court granted the defendants' motion, concluding that they were entitled to qualified immunity from the plaintiffs' claims. The plaintiffs appeal this decision.

FN13. To the extent the plaintiffs' suit against the defendants in their official capacities with the Bureau seeks retrospective monetary damages, this action constitutes a suit against the state that is prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 906‑07 (7th Cir.1986). This aspect of the plaintiffs' suit is, therefore, dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 907; see also id. at 907 n. 13 (noting that "a question of subject matter jurisdiction ... may be raised at any time in the litigation").

    II.

 *9 On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment, a decision we review de novo, construing all facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Ben's Bar, Inc. v. Village of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir.2003).

 The parties' principal dispute in this case concerns whether qualified immunity shields the defendants from any liability arising out of the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme Court held that a court's qualified immunity analysis must proceed in two steps. Id. at 200. The threshold inquiry is whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, "the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right[.]" Id . at 201. This must be the initial inquiry. Id. If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity. Id. If, on the other hand, "a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established." Id. We proceed in this fashion because this analytical framework "promotes clarity in the legal standards for official conduct, to the benefit of both the officers and the general public." Doyle v. Camelot Care Centers, Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 616 (7th Cir.2002). With these principles in mind, we now consider the merits of the plaintiffs' respective claims on appeal.

 A. Fourth Amendment Claims

 We begin our analysis with Greendale and John Doe Jr.'s claims that the defendants conducted an illegal search and seizure on the premises of the school, pursuant to Wis. Stat. ' 48.981(3)(c)1, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. [FN14] The Fourth Amendment, incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, Contreras v. City of Chicago, 119 F.3d 1286, 1290 (7th Cir.1997), provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ...." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Because the basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment "is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials," Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967), the amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures protects against warrantless intrusions during civil as well as criminal investigations by the government. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978). Thus, the strictures of the Fourth Amendment apply to child welfare workers, as well as all other governmental employees. Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1010 n. 4 (7th Cir.2000); Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 900 (7th Cir.1986).

FN14. A private school, like any other corporation or business, is entitled to bring a Fourth Amendment challenge for the illegal search of its premises. G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967).

 *10 The threshold consideration in a Fourth Amendment inquiry is whether the governmental conduct in question constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the amendment's text. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001); Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1010. In this case, defendants Wichman and Heck, with the assistance of the police, investigated allegations of child abuse on the premises of Greendale. As part of that investigation, they took John Doe Jr. into custody to interview him. We think it is clear that the foregoing actions constitute both a search and a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

 When the Fourth Amendment was ratified, as now, to "search" meant " '[t]o look over or through for the purpose of finding something; to explore; to examine by inspection; as, to search the house for a book; to search the wood for a thief." ' Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33 n. 1 (quoting N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 66 (1828) (reprint 6th ed.1989)). The defendant caseworkers' investigation on Greendale's premises easily meets this definition because the defendants went to the school for the specific purpose of gathering information, an activity that most certainly constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32 n. 1; see also 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment ' 2.1(a) at 379 (1996) (noting that "[u]nder the traditional approach, the term 'search' is said to imply 'some exploratory investigation, or an invasion and quest, a looking for or seeking out" ') (citation omitted).

 A person has been "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would not have believed that he was free to leave. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); White v. City of Markham, 310 F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir.2002). Here, the facts surrounding the defendants' seizure of John Doe Jr. are not in dispute. John Jr. was escorted from class by Principal Bond, the defendant caseworkers, and a uniformed police officer, into the church's nursery (which was empty). He was then questioned by Heck and Wichman, with the uniformed police officer present, for twenty minutes about intimate details of his family life. Under these circumstances, we conclude that John Jr. was "seized" with the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because no reasonable child would have believed that he was free to leave the nursery. Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1010 (holding that the defendants' action of taking a child into custody, without the consent of his parents, for the purpose of questioning him about allegations of child neglect was a seizure under the Fourth Amendment).  [FN15]

FN15. See also Roska v. Peterson, 304 F.3d 982, 992 (10th Cir.2002) (holding that 12‑year‑old boy was seized by a social worker while being removed from his home because he was "not free to leave"); Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749, 762 (2d Cir.2000) (holding that baby was seized by a government agency official during child abuse investigation even though an infant "is unlikely to have had a 'belief' as to whether or not she was free to leave the Hospital ... [because her mother] was told in no uncertain terms that she could not take [her] home from the Hospital"); Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 602 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that 5‑ year‑old girl was seized by a government official when she was taken from her school to a hospital where she was required to remain for several hours before being examined and returned to her parents).

 Having concluded that the defendants searched Greendale's premises and seized John Doe Jr., we must now "evaluate the search or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299‑300 (1999); see also Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1010. In doing so, we recognize that although "the underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures be reasonable, what is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes place." New Jersey v. T.L .O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995) (noting that "[w]hat expectations are legitimate [under the Fourth Amendment] varies, of course, with context, depending, for example, upon whether the individual asserting the privacy interest is at home, at work, in a car, or in a public park") (internal citation omitted).

 *11 The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the "distinction between searches and seizures that take place on a man's property‑‑his home or office‑‑ and those carried out elsewhere," Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474 (1971), holding that "a search or seizure carried out on ... [private] premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the [government] can show that it falls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions based on the presence of 'exigent circumstances." ' Id. at 474‑75; see also Camara, 387 U.S. at 528‑29; United States v. Spears, 965 F.2d 262, 271 (7th Cir.1992).

 Moreover, the principle that a warrantless search or seizure conducted on private property is presumptively unreasonable applies whether "the government's motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws or breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards," Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 312‑313, so long as the claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises on which the search or seizure occurred. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U .S. 83, 88 (1998) (holding that the " 'capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends ... upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place" ') (citation omitted); see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31‑33; Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 654 (7th Cir.2001).

 A reasonable expectation of privacy exists when: (1) the claimant exhibits an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and (2) the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. United States v. French, 291 F.3d 945, 951 (7th Cir.2002). Here, there is no question that the defendants' search of Greendale and seizure of John Doe Jr. took place on private property. The only question then is whether Greendale and John Jr. had a reasonable expectation of privacy in or within the school's premises. We conclude that they did.

 Private schools, by their very nature, are controlled environments that, out of sheer necessity (i.e., for the safety and protection of the children entrusted to them) are not open to the general public. Simpson v. Saroff, 741 F.Supp. 1073, 1078 (S.D.N.Y.1990); see also Siebert, 256 F.3d at 654 (noting that an enclosed structure is typically a location for a property owner to engage in private activities, which is generally sufficient to place government agents on notice "to keep out"). Thus, by their very operation, private schools exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy in their premises.  [FN16] Simpson, 741 F.Supp. at 1078 (holding that private school exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in its premises "because it occupied them on a permanent basis, kept up the premises through expenditures on improvements, and exercised at all times the right to exclude others from the premises ...."). And while John Jr. may not have exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in Greendale's premises, we have held that such a showing is unnecessary when the search or seizure at issue is of a young child. Darryl H., 801 F.2d at 901 (holding that "[a] child of very tender years may not exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy in the same sense as an older child. He is, however, a human being, entitled to be treated by the state in a manner compatible with that human dignity."). In such cases, it is more appropriate to consider whether the child's parents manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the premises within which the search or seizure being challenged took place. Id. (noting that when a child is searched by the government for purposes of a child abuse investigation, "[a]lso at stake ... are the closely related legitimate expectations of the parents or other caretakers, protected by the fourteenth amendment, that their familial relationship will not be subject to unwarranted state intrusion"). We conclude that by enrolling their son in Greendale, and entrusting him to the care of the school's officials in loco parentis, Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 654, the Does manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the premises of the school.

FN16. Additionally, in this case, Principal Bond and Pastor Holloway clearly expressed the school's subjective expectation of privacy in its premises by initially refusing to allow Bureau caseworkers to interview John Jr., and by refusing to permit the caseworkers to interview students during their second visit to the school.

 *12 Moreover, these subjective expectations of privacy were objectively reasonable. First, with respect to Greendale, "[t]he businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property." See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. at 543; cf. Curtis v. Thompson, 840 F.2d 1291, 1300 (7th Cir.1988) (noting that " '[w]ere the authority of government so trifling as to permit anyone with a complaint to have asked power to do anything he pleased ... Churches would be compelled to welcome into their buildings invaders who came but to scoff and jeer ...." ') (citation omitted). Second, although a child's privacy interests while attending a private school may differ from those he has under his own roof, he unquestionably has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises of the school he attends vis‑ á‑vis government officials. As the Supreme Court has explained, "[w]hen parents place minor children in private schools for their education, the teachers and administrators of those schools stand in loco parentis over the children entrusted to them." Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 654‑55. In our view, there is no basis for concluding that when a minor child is entrusted to the care of a private school in loco parentis his reasonable expectation of privacy, vis‑á‑vis government officials, differs in any material respect from that which he would otherwise expect to receive at home. In both cases, the child is in an enclosed structure that is not open to the general public, and is cared for and looked after by individuals with parental authority. Furthermore, it is entirely reasonable for parents who place their children in private schools, along with the teachers and administrators of those schools, to expect that the parents' express delegation of parental authority to school officials will be both acknowledged and respected by government actors. Cf. Muller by Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1535 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that "[t]he in loco parentis doctrine remains in full force in private schools"). Third, when, as in this case, the government conducts a warrantless search of a religious or parochial school, or seizes a minor child on the premises of such a school without a warrant, these actions implicate the constitutional rights of the school, child, and parents under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 468 (1985) (holding that when a government search or seizure implicates First Amendment rights, the requirements of the Fourth Amendment must be applied with "scrupulous exactitude"); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978) (same).

 Because we conclude that Greendale and John Doe Jr. had a reasonable expectation of privacy in and within the school's premises, the defendants' warrantless search of the school and seizure of the child are presumptively unreasonable, Camara, 387 U.S. at 528‑29, and can only be upheld if either falls within one of the "few specifically established and well delineated exceptions" to the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements, Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993) (citations and internal quotations omitted), e.g., consent, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973), or exigent circumstances. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984). See also Spears, 965 F.2d at 271. These exceptions, however, are grudgingly granted because "the privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment are to be jealously guarded." Wilson v. Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion County, 620 F.2d 1201, 1209 (7th Cir.1980). In addition to these well established exceptions, the Supreme Court has also held that occasionally the government may have " 'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, [which] make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable." ' Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 653 (citation omitted). In "special needs" cases, a lower standard may be appropriate, "depend[ing] in part upon whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search." Camara, 387 U.S. at 533.

 *13 On appeal, however, the defendants make no attempt to argue that their search of Greendale or seizure of John Doe Jr. falls within any of the foregoing specifically established and well delineated exceptions, or that the search or seizure was justified by "special needs." Their failure to do so speaks volumes about the evidentiary record in this case, which clearly shows that the defendants' search of the school and seizure of the child were not done pursuant to a court order, probable cause, or exigent circumstances.  [FN17] Instead, the defendants argue, taking their cue from the district court's opinion, that their search of Greendale and seizure of John Jr. were reasonable under the guidelines established by this court in Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir.1986), and Landstrom v. Illinois Dept. of Children & Family Services, 892 F .2d 670 (7th Cir.1990), both of which involved challenges to the constitutionality of child welfare caseworkers forcing children suspected of abuse to disrobe for physical examination on school grounds. 801 F.2d at 896‑97; 892 F.2d at 671‑72.

FN17. The record shows that it took the Bureau almost two months to process the report alleging that M.G. had been abused. Moreover, although the defendants claim that they were concerned that John Jr.'s parents may have subjected him to abuse by sending him to a school that used corporal punishment as a means of disciplining its students, they waited almost a month before deciding to report that John Jr. was in need of protective services. Finally, the defendants also waited several days before referring the other children of the plaintiff parents after John Jr. identified them as students who received spankings at the school.

 In Darryl H., we held that, under the circumstances of that particular case, we could not "say that the Constitution requires that a visual inspection of the body of a child who may have been the victim of child abuse can only be undertaken when the standards of probable cause or a warrant are met." 801 F.2d at 902. Instead, we concluded that the constitutionality of these inspections should be evaluated under the reasonableness test of the Fourth Amendment, id., and reaffirmed that holding in