BOX-FOLDER-REPORT: 118-4-256
TITLE:             Democratizing Communism Through the Ballot Box?
BY:                Slobodan Stankovic
DATE:              1985-7-2
COUNTRY:           (n/a)
ORIGINAL SUBJECT:  RAD Background Report/64

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RFE-RL
RADIO FREE EUROPE Research

RAD Background Report/64
(Eastern Europe)
2 July 1985

DEMOCRATIZING COMMUNISM THROUGH THE BALLOT BOX?

Introduction

Although it is neither a panacea for any of society's ills nor the only component of the democratic form of government, free elections continue to mesmerize communist regimes and populaces. Despite ideological protestations to the contrary, the right of the citizen to choose his government from a number of alternatives is tacitly accepted as superior to self-appointment and co-optation. Communist regimes have always sought to enhance what they believe is the intrinsic legitimacy of their system by bringing the public to the ballot box at periodic intervals. The primitive method of confirmation without choice has now, however, begun to be seen as an impediment to the public's cooperation with some governments in the bloc.

It is not without reason that of the three governments in Eastern Europe that have changed, or are about to change, their electoral laws, two preside over societies in turmoil and decline, while the third has pursued a reformist course for which a high measure of general consensus is vital. In Poland and Yugoslavia the regimes need to gain public support in order to ensure their survival, and both would prefer to obtain it without resort to extreme forms of coercion. The two differ, of course; but both face a crisis that extends to all social areas.

A mindless "election" of the Soviet type would probably exacerbate rather than alleviate social tension. A reformed election is seen by these regimes as causing less harm. Hungary, to give it the benefit of the doubt, perhaps feels that the incongruence between a confirmatory election and the reform movement would be too ludicrous to sustain. There is a logic in communist reformism that brings it to the point where political changes must be made, even if the avowed original intention was no more than to achieve economic efficiency. Hence the attempt to marshal rather than to dictate.

There is a hitch. A free election, by definition, cannot be held under communist rule. The governments that feel that they ought to liberalize procedures must do so in a way that would assure their own retention of power. They cannot allow political pluralism, but they can pretend to allow pluralism of elected officers. The cloning of candidates by the center is the obvious answer. Instead of presenting 300 candidates, the regime can easily produce 600 while still feeling comfortable that the 300 who will be returned are reliable. An additional fail-safe mechanism is being built in. Between 10% and 15% of the seats are allotted beforehand to national figures. By no stretch of the imagination can multiple candidacies in communist countries be called democratic.

Yet, apart from the implicit recognition of the value of a democratic institution, there is a modicum of opportunity for the citizen to express his preference in this new arrangement, especially the Hungarian model, which has been brought to life against a background of general relaxation in that country. If meetings of the electorate are given a say in the nomination of candidates, whatever effort the government must then expend to rectify any result that it perceives as adverse, the disputation introduces into the relationship between the rulers and the ruled an element that is missing in the other communist-governed lands. One could perhaps call it budding contestation or learning how to stand up and be counted, even if the result is nil. In conducive environments, like the Yugoslav and possibly the Hungarian, the choice between people at the local level may also be less than totally insignificant. In a reformed election, the communist party, while conceding no power, willy-nilly permits the electorate a little more insight into a process that is alien to communism and essential to democracy.

Vladimir Kusin

Elections in Hungary: New Style, Old Substance?

"The new [electoral] law is a significant step forward in the development of socialist democracy," according to Imre Pozsgay, the General Secretary of the Patriotic People's Front (PPF).[1] In his report to the 13th Congress of HSWP on March 27, Pozsgay assured party delegates that the parliamentary and local council elections on 8 June 1985[2] would be conducted in accordance with the resolutions of the congress. The elections were anticipated with special interest, since they were the first test of the much publicized electoral reforms (Law HI/1983[3]) passed by parliament on 22 December 1983.

The regime, sensitive to criticism that its economic reforms were not being followed by similar political changes, decided that the time had come to revise the existing law. After long preparation by the PPF and the Ministry of Justice and a lengthy national debate, a number of changes were adopted:

Multiple candidacies were made mandatory

Local boards [eloljarosag] were to be set up to simplify the administration of the elections in small localities

A separate national list made up of "outstanding personalities of political and public life" was introduced[4]

Candidates for parliament and local councils would now require a third of the votes cast at the nominating meetings, and local council members and parliamentary deputies would require more than half of the votes to be elected.[5]

The regime apparently chose a two-pronged strategy for emphasizing the "democratic" features of the new electoral law. On the one hand, much propaganda was devoted to impressing people with the "far-reaching significance" of multiple candidacies, stressing the differences between the "token candidacies" of the "preliberation" era and the new system, and the importance of competition.

On the other, there was apparently a general campaign to educate people in the "democratic process." This was especially interesting, since it implied that many Hungarians were not really prepared for democracy and were therefore still unable to take full advantage of the "benefits" of the new law. One provincial paper, for example, claimed that many people felt that "their names should not even be brought up [as potential candidates], if their chances of becoming elected were not 100%," because of the loss of prestige that a defeat would entail.[6] Other articles called attention to the "unfounded" concern that not every constituency would be able to put forward two suitable candidates and to the view allegedly held by some of the electorate that there was "no real need for another person."[7] There were also potential nominees, the public was told, who, if it were not for the vigilance of the PPF, would "abuse democracy" by taking advantage of temporary tension and sensitive issues to gain "popularity and cheap success."[8] These fears and problems, the Nepszabadsag correspondent Laszlo Szabo insisted, could only be eliminated through determined "practical work."[9]

Despite all the fervor and empty official rhetoric about the elections, it is difficult to see how the average Hungarian citizen has benefited from the changes made by the new Electoral Act. One must even question the cautious optimism that the dissident Pal Szalai expressed in the samizdat periodical A Hirmondo,[10] when he examined some of the possibilities that he felt had been opened up by the reform. Given the political reality, his hope that the new electoral system could eventually be turned into a "school for practicing democracy" is wishful thinking at best. Dreams of "filling the new electoral system with substance" disregard the traditional relationship between party and state bodies and the "rubber stamp" role that parliament plays in that relationship. More important, they disregard the party's unwavering insistence on remaining the "leading force" in Hungarian society.

Like "democratic centralism," the governing principle of party life, "socialist democracy" is a Marxist-Leninist invention that, as even leading party officials admit, is not geared to broadening the political spectrum or facilitating the assertion of competing ideologies. It is a concept that is inseparable from the hegemony of Marxism, so that appeals for strengthening it are actually appeals for reinforcing, as HSWP Politburo member Gyorgy Aczel put it, the "interest-integration" function of the HSWP.

It is safe to conclude, then, that while promising on the surface, the enacted changes have little substantive significance. As Szalai's fellow dissident Gabor Demszky has pointed out, several nominees do not necessarily mean several alternatives.[11] While nominating meetings may put several names forward, candidates can only become official if they are willing to sign a written statement pledging their unconditional support for the program of the PPF.[12] Under these circumstances the choice comes down to selecting the lesser of two or more "evils." While the possibility exists, as Demszky noted, that a qualified and sincere candidate may come on the scene who knows the problems of his district and who is willing to press for more effective social policies, his voice will be lost in the absence of proper forums for genuine debate. Without an open exchange of ideas between constituents and candidates and without a political atmosphere in which views can be expressed freely without fear of repercussions, there can be no talk of democratic representation.

Steven Koppany

New Voting Law Approved in Poland

On May 29 the Polish authorities approved a new voting law, paving the way for the first national voting to the Sejm in five years. The last vote took place in March 1980, six months before massive public upheavals led to the emergence of the popular movement for self-determination. The vote was to be held in 1984 but was postponed because the authorities were afraid that the vote would be used to protest the government's policies and methods. This concern is apparent in the provisions of the new law.

The law provides for a further tightening of official control over voting. This is particularly obvious in the provisions for the nominating procedures as well as in the establishment of two separate lists of candidates, measures that all but ensure the selection of suitable deputies. Government officials have depicted the law as introducing a new measure of "democratization" into Poland's political life but have also admitted that this "democratization" is only "a step in the process of socialist renewal, which is conditioned by the objective needs of socialism."[13] Solidarity's underground leaders have already appealed for the organization of a nationwide boycott of the voting, scheduled for this fall, claiming that the procedure is designed to ensure continuing domination by the current political establishment.

According to the new law, candidates for seats in the Sejm will be presented on two separate lists: a district list, which will feature two candidates for each seat; and a national list, for which the number of candidates will be set by the Council of State before each vote. It is more than probable that for the forthcoming vote the number of candidates on the national list will be equal to the number of seats. The law says that the number of deputies "chosen" from the national list must not exceed 15% of all deputies? the Sejm has 460 deputies.

All candidates will have to be nominated by established public organizations: the voivodship bodies of such organizations nominate, candidates to be presented on district lists, and the National Council of PRON [the Patriotic Movement of National Rebirth] will nominate the candidates for the national list. The national list is to include the country's most important political personalities.

Once nominated, candidates are to be approved by special "electoral commissions" consisting of representatives of the official political parties as well as the three pro-government Catholic groups. Candidates will then be presented to the public during a series of "electoral" meetings, all organized and presided over by representatives of PRON.

The law does not provide for a mandatory secret ballot, but it not does require an open vote either. The choice of procedure is left to the voter, who may cross out one of the candidates for a seat listed on a district list and may also cross out the name of candidates listed on the national list. In the case of an unmarked ballot, it will be assumed that the vote is being cast for the candidate listed first? the names are not listed alphabetically but according to official preference.

The voting regulations are similar to those used in the vote for local council officials that was held in June 1984, and which Solidarity boycotted. The authorities claimed that the nationwide turnout averaged about 75% of the voters.

The introduction of two separate list of candidates follows the procedure that had already been established in the Hungarian voting law of 1983. Moreover, the national list makes possible for the establishment to demonstrate what the authorities are fond of calling a "coalition-based system of exercising power that has developed [in Poland] and is continually expanding. "[14]

J. B. de Weydenthal

Yugoslavia's Electoral System to be "Liberalized"

A year ago Professor Slobodan Inic summed up his criticism of the Yugoslav voting system, known as the system of delegations, in the following sentence: "those who are meant to be elected actually elect the people who are supposed to elect them, which means that they alone elect themselves."[15]

This unique system was introduced in 1974 to replace the parliamentary system, which was employed for the last time during the 1969 elections. Despite more or less complete control by the party, these elections were criticized for having made it possible to have (at least at the local level) multiple candidates.

As a consequence, the February 1974 constitution (which is still in force) launched the system of delegations, an indirect form of voting based on the idea of "imperative mandate," meaning that elected delegates (not deputies) to various assemblies are unable to express their own views but must instead vote strictly according to instructions "from the base." This "base" is controlled by the party. To all appearances, Yugoslavs are encouraged to take part in electing their delegates freely, but this is only at the local level. The members of the provincial, republican, and federal assemblies are nominated by the party; and the voters only confirm them.

To lend a semblance of democracy, millions of people are organized to engage in discussions, registrations, and nominations, although the decisions about who will actually represent them are taken by the leadership.

Changes in Electoral System Suggested.

For the last five years there have been demands for changes in the electoral system to enable multiple candidates for seats in the various assemblies. The next general elections are planned for 1986, when many thousands of new delegates will be elected and new state officials appointed on the communal, provincial, republican, and federal levels. A Montenegrin official, Tomislav Knezevic, recently complained that "our present electoral system does not give us any real chance to elect, nor even to influence  the elections, but only to accept [what other people have decided], to agree, and to express enthusiasm."[16]

The changes that are being suggested include the provision that several candidates should be nominated for one seat not only in local communal assemblies but also in the two provincial, six republican, and one federal assemblies. The draft law has not yet been published, but special committees have been discussing "radical changes" in the political system in general and in the electoral system in particular.

The present Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is composed of two chambers: the Federal Chamber with 220 delegates and the Chamber of Republics & Provinces with 88 delegates. Should the electoral system really be "radically changed," the Federal Assembly can also be expected to be reorganized.

Slobodan Stankovic
   
* * *

1 Magyar Nemzet, 28 March 1985.

2 Nepszabadsag, 3 March 1985.

3 Magyar Kozlony, 27 December 1983.

4 The maximum number of candidates on this list was set at 10% of the total number of constituencies. Since this number was kept unchanged at 352, the national list contained 35 candidates. Clearly an undemocratic feature, the incontestibility of the list was said to be necessary "in order to ensure that the election does not degenerate into a mere formality and to spare people from having to challenge nationally known and popular people--in a situation that is hopeless from the start." Magyarorszag, 10 March 1985.

5 For a detailed description of the revised law, see Alfred Reisch, "Hungary Unveils Draft Electoral law and Submits it to Public Debate," RAD Background Report/224 (Hungary), Radio Free Europe Research, 26 September 1983 1-9; and Ferenc Majores, Wahlrechtsreform in Ungarn, (Cologne: Bundesinstitut fuer Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 1984), pp. 33-36.

6 Hajdu-Bihari Naplo, 21 March 1985.

7 Del-Magyarorszag, 23 March 1985.

8 Dolgozok Lapja, 15 March 1985.

9 Nepszabadsag, 15 March 1985.

10 No. 1, November 1984.

11 Gabor Demszky, "Electoral Law Reform Without Alternatives," Hirmondo, no. 3, January 1984, pp. 1-3.

12 Magyar Hirlap (Supplement), 8 May 1984.

13 Trybuna Ludu, 30 May 1985

14 Ibid.

15 Intervju (Belgrade), 25 May 1984.

16 Vjesnik (Zagreb), 12 April 1985.

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