The use of "syndromes" as evidence in general has been largely discredited. Many courts throughout the United States have ruled such evidence to be inadmissible in determining whether or not abuse had actually occurred.

Some cases that have rejected the use of syndrome evidence as affirmative proof of the occurrence of abuse include: People v. Bowker (1988), Cal. Ct. App., 249 Cal.Rptr. 886; Leon, 263 Cal.Rptr. 77; Lantrip v. Commonwealth (1986), Ky., 713 S.W.2d 816; State v. York (1989), Me., 564 A.2d 389; State v. Lawrence (1988), Me., 541 A.2d 1291; State v. Black (1988), Me., 537 A.2d 1154; Goodson v. State (1990), Miss., 566 So.2d 1142; J.Q. II, 617 A.2d 1196; State v. Michaels (1993), N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., 625 A.2d 489, aff'd (1994), N.J., 642 A.2d 1372; People v. Duell (1990), N.Y. App. Div., 558 N.Y.S.2d 395; State v. Schimpf (1989), Tenn. Crim. App., 782 S.W.2d 186; Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388; State v. Gokey (1990), Vt., 574 A.2d 766; State v. Jones (1993), Wash. Ct. App., 863 P.2d 85, review denied (1994), Wash., 881 P.2d 254.

The 1991-1992 San Diego Grand Jury found the use of these syndromes and other behavioral indicators to be in widespread use by prosecutors and child protective caseworkers as evidence in juvenile dependency cases. (San Diego County Grand Jury, Report No. 8, Child Sexual Abuse, Assault, and Molest Issues, June 29, 1992).

Another San Diego Grand Jury found in 1994 that these syndromes and other behavioral indicators were still in widespread use by prosecutors and child protective caseworkers, concluding:

"Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome (CSAS), or Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS), or Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) or other theories utilizing behavior as a basis for proof of child sexual abuse is discredited and unacceptable". (San Diego County Grand Jury, Report 7a, Analysis of Child Molestation Issues, June 1, 1994).